Bucknell University

Bucknell Digital Commons
Faculty Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

May 2011

Economic Policies to Address the Environmental Consequences
of Global Reuse
Thomas C. Kinnaman
Bucknell University, kinnaman@bucknell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/fac_journ
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Kinnaman, Thomas C.. "Economic Policies to Address the Environmental Consequences of Global Reuse."
American Economic Review (2011) : 71-76.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Bucknell Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Bucknell Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact dcadmin@bucknell.edu.

Economic Policies to Address
The Environmental Consequences of Global Reuse
By THOMAS KINNAMAN AND HIDE-FUMI YOKOO*
The international trade of used consumer
electronics, a concept we call global reuse, has
been growing rapidly over the past decade.
Japan, for example, has increased its exports of
used personal computers from just 0.18 million
units in 2001 to 1.42 million units in 2008
(PC3R Promotion Center, 2010). Japan also
exported 2.25 million used television sets in
2008 (Aya Yoshida and Atsushi Terazono,
2010) and the United States exported 10.2
million used personal computers in 2002. Most
of these exports go to developing countries.
Used electronic goods exported to
developing countries become electronic wastes
(e-wastes) that are usually disassembled in
those developing countries. E-waste is often
comprised of toxic substances such as lead,
mercury, cadmium, and flame retardants.
Because e-waste disposal and disassembly
practices vary widely between developed and
developing countries, exporting used personal
electronics may have consequences on both
human health and the global environment.
This paper presents a model to solve for
economically efficient tax and subsidy rates in
an economy with international trade in used
consumer electronics. The two-country model
considers disposal taxes levied in both the
developed and developing country, an import
tax on used consumer electronics, and a
subsidy paid for the return of the e-waste to
developed countries for disassembly.
I. Disassembling Practices

E-waste in developing countries is
dismantled by individuals and small businesses
using labor intensive methods in order to
collect embedded precious metals (Alejandra
Sepúlveda, Mathias Schluep, Fabrice Renaud,
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Martin Streicher, Ruediger Kuehr, Christian
Hagelüken and Andreas C. Gerecke, 2010).
This dismantling process, which can include
open burning of circuit boards, cables, and
plastics, and the manual dismantling of cathode
ray tubes, involves the release of toxic
substances. For example, ambient dioxin and
furan concentrations in the air around an ewaste dismantling site in China are the highest
in the world (Huiru Li, Liping Yu, Guoying
Sheng, Jiamo Fu, and Ping’an Peng, 2007). As
a result, blood lead levels in children within
proximity to this Chinese dismantling site
significantly exceed the Chinese mean.
Concentrations of lead, dioxins and furans in ewaste dismantling sites in India also exceed
World
Health
Organization
guidelines
(Sepúlveda et al., 2010).
High labor costs and labor safety standards
in many developed countries make labor
intensive methods of dismantling e-waste
uneconomical.
Instead, used consumer
electronics are first shredded and then magnets
and blowers separate the precious metals from
the various plastics. The metals are then sent to
a smelter and the plastics to a recycler. Threats
to human health and environment are reduced
relative to those associated with labor-intensive
methods in developing countries. E-waste in
the United States is also disposed into landfills.
But most e-waste collected in the United
States (roughly 80%) is exported to developing
countries for reuse or for human dismantling1.
Economic policy instruments may be partly
responsible for the export of used electronics.
Japan implemented in 2003 a producer
responsibility
measure
that
requires
manufactures to send consumers shipping
1
In 2005, the U.S. discarded 1.36-1.72 million metric tons
of e-waste in landfills. Only 0.31-0.34 million metric tons
were dismantled domestically. E-waste accounts for 70%
of the heavy metals in U.S. landfills (U.S. EPA, 2007).

labels for sending used personal computers to
nearby reclaiming locations (consumers pay the
yen equivalent of a $35 fee). One half to three
quarters of all personal computers sold in Japan
are returned in this fashion, but these
reclaiming facilities often export used personal
computers to developing countries (Aya
Yoshida, Tomohiro Tasaki, and Atsushi
Terazono, 2009). In the United States, twenty
four states either ban the disposal of e-waste in
landfills or require manufacturers to subsidize
the “recycling” process.
The states of
California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, South
Carolina and New Jersey require residents to
pay an advanced recycling fee of between
US$6 and US$10 for each new TV or PC
purchased2.
These policies represent an
implicit tax on the domestic disposal of e-waste
in developing countries. This paper examines
whether such taxes are consistent with global
economic efficiency.
II. The Theory of Global Reuse

Within the economics literature, only
Takayoshi Shinkuma (2009) has modeled the
international trade in used personal electronics
and argues that producer responsibility
measures such as those implemented in Japan
are inefficient.
Brian Copeland (1991)
examines the international trade in solid waste
and argues for the elimination of such trade if
waste receiving countries lack waste disposal
policies. Other papers consider the unilateral
strategic use of waste taxes to improve
domestic importing and exporting industries.
Hide-Fumi Yokoo (2010) theoretically
analyzes whether the reuse of consumer
electronics decreases e-waste.
This paper extends upon the work of
Shinkuma (2009) and Copeland (1991) by
evaluating incentive-based policy alternatives
to internalize the social costs associated with
exporting consumer electronics. A model is
developed to structure the tax and subsidy
policies available to internalize the disposal
2
See Hai-Yong Kang and Julie M. Schoenung (2005) and
Ramzy Kahhat, Junbeum Kim, Ming Xu, Braden Allenby,
Eric Williams and Peng Zhang (2008) for details of U.S. ewaste management policies.

costs of used durable goods.3 The model
consists of a wealthy developed country
(Country A) and a less wealthy developing
country (Country B).
A representative
consumer in Country A derives utility from the
consumption of durable good such as a
personal computer. After consumption, the
durable good is either disposed or disassembled
in Country A or exported as a used durable
good to Country B for additional consumption.
The representative consumer in Country B
derives utility from the used durable good and a
locally produced non-durable good such as an
agricultural product, a local service, or leisure.
The disposal of this non-durable good is
assumed to generate no hazardous e-waste. All
used durable goods imported to Country B
must also be disassembled in Country B (we
allow later for the possible return of e-waste
from the used durable good for processing in
Country A). The representative consumer in
both Country A and B gain disutility from the
aggregate quantity of e-waste disposed or
disassembled in their own country. In the
absence of tax policies, this loss in utility is not
internalized by agents in the economy – a
source of market failure.
The economies in both countries utilize a
single economic resource such as capital, labor,
or energy for five production and transportation
activities. This resource can be allocated to (1)
produce the consumer electronic in Country A,
(2) disassemble e-waste in Country A, (3)
transport the used consumer electronic to
Country B, (4) disassemble e-waste from the
imported consumer electronic in Country B,
and (5) produce the non-durable good in
Country B. The global supply of the economic
resource is constant.
The Pareto Optimum is found by allocating
the economic resource to maximize the utility
of the representative consumer in Country A
subject to holding constant the utility of the
representative consumer in Country B, subject
to the 5 production technologies defined above,
subject to the assumed constant supply of the
economic resource, and subject to the materials

3

See Hide-Fumi Yokoo and Thomas Kinnaman (2010) for
a thorough presentation of this model.

balance constraints governing the flow of the
used durable good.
Having characterized the Pareto Optimum,
the model next solves for rates of various taxes
necessary for the decentralized competitive
economy to achieve the Pareto Optimum.
Three tax instruments are available to this
economy – a tax on e-waste in Country A, a tax
on e-waste in Country B, and a tax on the
import of the used durable good to Country B.
The representative consumer in Country A
maximizes utility by allocating their income
between purchasing the used durable good and
paying to disassemble the e-waste.
The
consumer can also earn income from exporting
and selling the used durable good to the
representative consumer in Country B, but must
pay a competitive firm to export the used
durable good to Country B. The representative
consumer in Country B maximizes utility by
allocating income to purchase the (taxed)
imported used durable good, to purchase the
local non-durable good¸ and to pay to
disassemble e-waste from used durables.
Representative competitive firms from each
of the five industries defined above each
employ the economic resource and a
production technology to maximize profit. In
Country A, one representative firm chooses the
quantity of the durable good to produce, a
second chooses the quantity of e-waste to
disassemble (and pays a disposal tax), and a
third chooses the quantity of the used durable
good to export to the representative consumer
in Country B. In Country B, one firm chooses
the quantity of the non-durable good to
produce¸ and a second chooses the quantity of
e-waste to disassemble and potentially pays a
disposal tax on each unit disassembled.
Given the assumptions of this model, the
Pareto Optimum can be achieved by utility and
profit maximizing agents with several intuitive
combinations of these three tax instruments,
which are summarized in Table 1.
In the first scenario, both countries are able
to assess a tax on their own domestic e-waste
and set the e-waste tax equal to their own
external marginal cost of e-waste (defined as
EMCA and EMCB). The import tax is not
necessary. In the second scenario, Country B is

unable to tax e-waste. Perhaps the economy
lacks the necessary technology (such as scales
for weighing e-waste hauling trucks as they
enter and exit a disposal site) or the
government lacks administrative resources to
discourage illegal dumping that might arise
with the implementation of an e-waste tax. The
Pareto Optimum can be recovered in this
economy by implementing an import tax set
equal to the external marginal cost in County B.
Either the import tax or the e-waste tax results
in the representative consumer in Country B
internalizing the social costs of their e-waste.
The efficiency of the import tax relies heavily
on the assumption that no other disposal or
recycling methods are available to the
consumer in Country B. If the consumer has
more than one disposal option, and those
options involve different external costs, then an
“upstream” tax such as the import tax does not
encourage consumers to efficiently choose
among those options.
TABLE 1
Scenario

Country A
E-waste Tax

Country B
E-waste Tax

Country B
Import Tax

1

EMCA

EMCB

Zero

2

EMCA

Zero

EMCB

3

EMCA-EMCB

Zero

Zero

In the third scenario, we assume no policy
instrument is available to Country B. Mexico,
for example, eliminated trade restrictions on all
10-15 year-old vehicles in 2005 in accordance
with NAFTA.
The only remaining tax
instrument to this economy is the e-waste tax in
Country A. The Pareto Optimum can still be
achieved by setting this tax equal to the
difference between the marginal cost of
disposal in Country A and that of Country B. If
willingness to pay for environmental quality is
higher in Country A than in Country B, perhaps
owing to higher income levels, then the e-waste
tax in Country A remains positive but will be
set at a level below the external marginal cost
in Country A. If instead external costs of
disposal are higher in B than in A, perhaps
owing to primitive open dumping practices that
threaten human health, then e-waste disposal
should be subsidized in Country A. This

subsidy will discourage exports to Country B.
Examining the three tax scenarios in Table 1
suggests that the difference in e-waste taxes
matters for efficiency, not their levels.
Although differences in e-waste tax across
countries almost certainly matter to the
efficient flow of e-waste resources, simplifying
assumptions in the model might overstate the
flexibility among scenarios 1, 2, and 3. Such
perfect flexibility would likely disappear in a
model comprised of more than two countries or
with alternative disposal options (such as
recycling) in Country B. We also note that the
e-waste tax does not induce a substitution effect
in Country A.
III. A Return Economy

Consider a similar economy where a
technology is available to return e-waste from
the used durable good back to Country A for
disposal. This process requires the global
economic resource as the sole input – bringing
to six the number of industries utilizing the
economic resource. For reasons articulated
above, assume the import tax and Country B ewaste tax are not available. The remaining
policy options are the e-waste tax in Country A
and a subsidy on the return of e-waste to
Country A.
The return subsidy can be
administered by the government in Country B,
a benevolent government in Country A, or by
the original producers of the durable good as
part of a producer responsibility policy.
Once again, differences in tax rates are
important to achieving the Pareto Optimum
rather than tax levels. Four such policy
scenarios are summarized in Table 2.
To represent the various policy scenarios
generated by the model, the external marginal
cost in Country A (originally EMCA) is
separated into that from the aggregate e-waste
generated by consumers in Country A
(EMCAA) and the that from the aggregate
returned e-waste generated from consumers in
Country B (EMCBA). The e-waste from these
two sources is identical from the consumer’s
viewpoint, but the quantities may differ. If
consumers in Country A disassemble
domestically more e-waste than they export to

Country B for reuse, then EMCAA > EMCBA for
the simple reason that there will be less e-waste
material returned to Country A than was
originally disassembled in Country A. EMCBA
will exceed EMCAA only if the amount returned
to Country A exceeds the amount originally
disassembled in Country A. The external
marginal cost of e-waste disassembled in
Country B continues to be defined as EMCB.
TABLE 2
Country A
E-Waste Tax

Country B
Return Subsidy

1

- (EMCB)

- (EMCBA)

2

EMCAA

EMCB+EMCAA - EMCBA

3

EMCBA

EMCB

4

EMCBA - EMCB

Zero

Scenario

In Scenario 1, the Pareto Optimum can be
obtained by combining an e-waste subsidy in
County A with a return tax in Country B. The
subsidy in Country A must equal the external
marginal cost of disposal in County B.
Consumers in Country A therefore internalize
the social costs of exporting the used durable
good to Country B. The return subsidy is also
negative, a tax on the return of e-waste to
Country A. This tax is set equal to the external
marginal cost of the returned e-waste for
disassembly in Country A.
Although theoretical efficient, neither of
these two policies in Scenario one would be
popular within each country. Considers the
second scenario where Country A acts
unilaterally by setting its e-waste tax equal to
the external marginal cost of e-waste in
Country A (EMCA).
The global Pareto
Optimum can be achieved if Country B were to
set its return subsidy equal to external marginal
cost of e-waste disassembled in Country B
(EMCB – to internalize domestic social costs
for consumers in Country B) plus the external
marginal cost in Country A (EMCAA – to
neutralize the positive e-waste tax in Country
A) minus the external marginal cost of
disassembling returned e-waste in Country A
(EMCBA – to internalize international social
costs for consumers in Country B). In the
event that EMCAA > EMCBA, the return subsidy

will be greater than the external marginal cost
of disassembly in Country B.
Country B acts unilaterally in Scenario 3 by
setting the return subsidy equal to the external
marginal cost of e-waste in Country B such that
their consumers internalize domestic social ewaste disassembly costs. The Pareto Optimum
can only be achieved if Country A sets their ewaste tax equal to the external marginal cost of
disposing Country B’s returned e-waste in
Country A (EMCBA), a rate that may be below
the unilateral tax rate in Country A if the
quantity returned from Country B is exceeded
by the quantity originally disassembled In
Country A.
If both countries act unilaterally, the
resulting tax and subsidy rates will achieve the
Pareto Optimum only in the rare case that
EMCAA = EMCBA (the quantity of original ewaste disassembled in Country A is equal to
the quantity returned from Country B). This
condition is also met when e-waste disassembly
in Country A generates no external costs
(EMCAA = EMCBA = 0). External disassembly
costs are zero if environmental policies in
developed countries result in disassembly
plants internalizing all social costs of the
disassembly process.
In the fourth scenario assume that lacking
administrative resources, the return of e-waste
to Country A cannot be subsidized. The only
available policy instrument is the e-waste tax in
Country A. The global Pareto optimum can be
achieved by reducing the e-waste tax in
Country A to an amount equal to the external
marginal cost of disassembling the returned ewaste (such that consumers in County B
internalize social disposal costs in Country A)
less the external marginal cost of disposal cost
in Country B (such that consumers in Country
A internalize social disposal costs in Country
B). The optimal e-waste tax could be positive
or negative depending upon the magnitudes of
these two externalities. Country A would
subsidize domestic e-waste disposal if the
external cost of disposal in Country B exceeds
the external cost of returning the e-waste to
Country A.
If the e-waste tax in Country A is the only
available policy instrument, then by comparing

the Scenario 3 e-waste tax rate in the simple
economy with the Scenario 4 e-waste tax from
the return economy suggests the emergence of
the return technology serves to change the ewaste tax in County A by an amount equal to
the difference between EMCAA and EMCBA. If
EMCAA > EMCBA, then the e-waste tax
decreases with the emergence of the return
technology.
Finally, the results of the model provide
efficiency conditions for an economy void of ewaste policy instruments. A policy regime of
no e-waste taxes or subsidies in either country
will achieve the Pareto Optimum if external
disposal costs are equal across Countries A and
B (EMCBA = EMCB). Willingness to pay for
environmental quality is likely higher in
developed Country A than in Country B, but
exposures to toxins from labor-intensive
disassembly processes in Country B are likely
higher than for mechanized processes in
Country A. Combine these two effects, and the
two external costs may not be far apart.
The current policy environment features
implicit e-waste taxes in many developed
countries such as Japan and the United States.
These implicit e-waste taxes derive from
policies that ban e-waste from landfills in
developed
countries
and
producer
responsibility measures that subsidize the
return of used consumer electronics for
“recycling,” which usually involves exporting
the goods for disassembly in developing
countries. Developing countries impose no
known taxes on e-waste disassembly or any
import tariffs on used durable goods. This
policy environment is likely inefficient if the
implicit e-waste taxes in developed countries
do not consider external disassembly costs in
developing countries as is called for in the final
scenario of each economy modeled above
(Tables 1 and 2).
IV. Conclusion

This paper has provided a broad blueprint of
what international policy could look like to
manage the negative externality associated with
global reuse – the potential ill health effects of
employing labor-intensive dismantling of

electronic waste. If e-waste taxes or import
taxes are available in the developing country,
then setting these instruments equal to the
marginal external costs of disassembly are
warranted. Subsidy the return of e-waste
following the reuse of the consumer electronics
can also have lead to economic efficiency. But
in the absence of these policy options, the
implicit e-waste disposal taxes in many
developed countries should be lowered to rates
below external marginal costs in developed
countries to achieve global economic
efficiency.
The model also suggests that optimal
policies change only slightly when considering
the trade in used consumer electronics relative
to unusable e-waste. Optimal policy rates
displayed in Tables 1 and 2 are about the same.
Finally, the model has a few weaknesses that
could be addressed in future research. First, the
economic resource used to produce consumer
electronics and transport and disassemble ewaste is free to flow between the developed
and developing country. A more realistic
model would place constraints on this flow or
assume each country has a domestic economic
resource. Second, the model assumes only one
disassembly process (a labor intensive one) in
Country B. If other processes are available,
and if those processes vary with respect to
external costs, then some of the policy options
discussed in this paper are no longer efficient.
Finally, consumers in Country A gain utility
only from electronics. The lack of a second
good prevents a substitution effect if e-waste
taxes increase. If developing countries are
unable to implement e-waste policies, then
developed countries should reduce the implicit
e-waste disposal taxes.
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